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In a recent paper [8], Owen extends the definition of the Banzhaf
index [1], [2] to non-simple games. He characterizes it in terms of the
multilinear extension of games, which permits an intriguing comparison
with the characterization of the Shapley value which he obtained in [7].
Here we will develop an axiomatic formulation of this index which
will permit comparisons to be made with the original formulation of the
Shapley value [12], with the recent interpretation of the Shapley value
as a cardinal utility [9], and with recent treatments of the Banzaf and
related indices for simple games [31, [5], [6], [10].
For a set of players N = {l,...,n}, a game in characteristic function
form is a real valued function on the subsets of N, such that v(4>) = 0.
For a given game v, a coalition T C N is a carrier if for all S C N,
v(S) « v(TOS). If n is a permutation of N, then for all S C N we denote
the image of S under it by nS, and define the game irv by rrv(iTS) = v(S)
.
2
For each player i e N the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index for a game
V is defined by .
(1) *^(v) = E T^TT [v(S) - v(S-i) ]
i e S
Thus for each player i in a game v, the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index
is a weighted sum of the contributions which player i makes to each coalition
of which he is a member.
The sum over all players of such contributions will be denoted by
T(v) = S Z [v(S) - v(S-i)]
i E N S
i e S
We will show that ^ » (tj/j^, . . .i() ) is the unique function f = (f^^
•"^n^
which satisfies the following conditions.
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Condition 1: (Symmetry) For each permutation it, f . (irv) = f (v) .
Condition 2: (Addltivity) For any games v and w, f(v+w) = f(v)+f(w).
Condition 3: For each carrier T of v, Z f (v) = T(v)
1 e T 2°"^
Theorem 1 : The extended Banzhaf-Coleman index Is the unique function
which satislfies conditions 1, 2, and 3.
For each R C N, we will find it convenient to consider games of the
form cv defined by cv (S) = 5c if RC s In general we will denote
CO otherwise.
the cardinality of sets R, S, T by r, s, t.
Lemma 1: If f obeys conditions 1 and 3, then
f. (cvj^) "jcll^'^ if 1 e R
Co if 1 ^ R
Proof: Suppose i ^ R. Then R and R L/i are both carriers of the game v , so
condition 3 implies f
.
(cv ) » 0, But if i, j e R, then condition 1 implies
T(cv ) ,n-r
f^(cv^) » f^(cv^). so for 1 . R. f^(cv^) = \ —^ -^' -
"^
2n-l 2^^-^
Proof c? theorem: Every game ^ is a sum of games of the form cv_. In
Si
fact (cf.[12]), we can write v = E c v where
RON ^ ^
(2) c_ = I (-l)''"''v(T).
^ TCR
Thus if f is a function which obeys conditions 1, 2, and 3, then Lemma 1
and condition 2 imply that f is given by
f (v) - Z fi(cRV ) - E c —
1 e R
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So by equation (2) , we have
f,(v) = Z Z (-l)'''^v(T) -—-= 2 / I (-1)' -
_J^ j v(T)
^ RCNTCR 2 N R
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If we denote the term In parentheses by g (T) , then
(3) f^(v) = T ^ u gi(T)
[v(T) - v(T-i) ]
.
1 e T
But there are
( \ 1 coalitions R of size r such that R^ {lU i} , so
g (T) = E (-l)''-^ /n-t) —
^
^ r=t I r-t/ 2^" ^ •
Letting q = r-t and m = n-t we have
So by the binomial theorem.
Substituting this into equation (3), we see that it is the same as equation
(1) . Thus equation (1) gives the only function which might obey conditions
1, 2, and 3. It is easy to confirm that ^ obeys the conditions, which completes
the proof.
It should be noted that the conditions which determine the extended
Banzhaf-Coleman index are very similar to those which define the shapley value.
If the right hand side of condition 3 were changed from T(v)/2 to v(T)
,
then the modified conditions would define the Shapley value, given by the
familiar formula
hT 3 t
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Thus both the Shap],ey value and the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index
obey condit: 3ns 1 and 2, and both a ^ weighted sums of the terms
[v(S) - v(S-i)]. Both fimctions also obey the following, weaker version
of condition 3.
Condition 3a: For any carriers T, S of v, E f
,
(v) = E f
.
(v)
.
ieT isS
In general, we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 2: A function f = (f.,...,f ) obeys conditions 1, 2, and 3a
X n
if and only if
(4) f,(v) = E k.(t)[v(T) - v(T-i)]
^ TC N ^
ieT •
.
where k is a real valued function on t = l,...,n.
Proof: Clearly a function f given by equation (4) satisfies conditions
1 and 2. It also satisfies condition 3a, since if S is a carrier for v
and j ^ S, then f . (v> = 0. So 12 S is the minimum carrier of v, then
E f (v) ^ E .. f (v).
i e S i e S ... , , .
If f obeys condition-. 1, 2, and 3a then, following the proof of
Theorem 1, we see 'hat i^ (v ) depends only on r. So f can be written in
the form of equation v^) > where
k^(t) = I- (-i)''~^(r-Itl
^i^^'^ ^^^ ^i^^^ " ^i'^V ^""^ ^ ^ ^•
r=»t
A useful tool for examining other weighted suras is the multilinear
extension of a game, as defined in [7]. The multilinear extension of a
.e
,(v) 1 A « (v'» i S ,v
»£ bfif. ,S ,1 «o ( "J ^t) -^ 1 D
.)v - i'{
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game v is defined on the unit cube o£ dimension n by
f(x ,...,x ) = E { n X n (1-x )}v(S).
^ " SCNleSi^S
Note that If (x,,...,x ) is a vector of zeroes and ones, then f(x) = v(S)
1 n
where i e S if and only if x. = 1.
Differentiating with respect to x , we have
f(x,...,x)= E { n X. n (1-x )}[v(S) - v(S-l)].
•^ " SCNjeS^jjfS ^
1 e S j f' 1
Owen observed in [8] that the extended Banzhaf-Coleman index is
obtained by evaluating the gradient of f at the point (4> . . • ,*s) • In fact,
we see that at every point the gradient of f is a weighted sum of
terms of the form [v(S) - v(S-i)]. So by Theorem 2, we have the following
result.
Corollary 1; The gradient of the multilinear extension of a game
everywhere satisfies conditions 1, 2, and 3a.
In [9] it was shown that the shapley value is a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, characterized by Lhe fact that ^.(v ) = — for i e R. It
X K IT
can be shown that every function f which satisfies conditions 1, 2, and 3a
is also a utility, characterized by the numbers f.(v„). The author hopes
i K
to explore this further in a subsequent article [11].

FOOTNOTES
1. The definitions given by Coleman in [4] are also closely related.
2. We use the term "extended" to denote the fact that the original definitions
of Banzhaf and Coleman applied only to simple games, while equation (1)
extends the definition to non-simple games.
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